Interagency cooperation

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Warning - Disclaimer

This is a rapidly developing area. There are VERY few direct precedents. The following is an exposition of basic principles that you may find to be useful in assessing the *Charter* issues involved in interagency cooperation.

1. Does agency have the power?

- 1. Does the agency have the express or implied power to cooperate and share information and documents with other agencies?
- → This is relevant because administrative agencies have no inherent powers: e.g., Tranchemontagne v. Ontario (Director, Disability Support Program), [2006] 1 S.C.R. 513 at para. 16

1. Does agency have the power?

- → This is an issue of statutory interpretation: note the emphasis on statutory purpose and "context" in Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559, at paras. 26-27.
- → Potential breadth of implied/necessary powers: Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Canadian Liberty Net, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 626 and Global Securities Corp. v. British Columbia (Securities Commission), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 494.

2. Charter application

2. The *Charter* applies to state entities. Thus, each movement of information and documents to and from a state entity can potentially be subject to *Charter* protection.

Basic scenario



(Documents and information ["materials"])

"State Entity A"

("Documents and information" ["materials'])

"State Entity B"

A. Movements from holder of materials (e.g. suspect) to "Entity A".

- → Potential protection depending on ss. 7 and 8 jurisprudence.
- → First, are the documents and information being seized or are they just being received (someone on their own initiative sent an envelope)?

→ Does "Entity A" have the express or implicit power to seize documents and information?

→ Assume "Entity A" is the police. Seizure by police by criminal investigatory purposes: usually a warrant is required (Hunter v. Southam, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145)

→ Assume "Entity A" is a regulatory authority (e.g., securities commission). Seizure by regulatory authority may or may not attract Charter protection. Depends on the application of the test in R. v. Jarvis, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 757, esp. at paras. 93-94.

From "A" to "B" ("A" Violated *Charter*)

- B. Movements from "Entity A" to "Entity B".
- → Assume "Entity A" has violated the Charter in gathering the documents and information. "Entity A" transfers the documents and information to "Entity B".

From "A" to "B" "A" Violated *Charter*

→ Under s. 24(2), it is arguable that the documents and information will have been obtained by "Entity B" in a "manner that infringed or denied ... rights" in the sense that the documents and information could not have been obtained without Charter breach

From "A" to "B" "A" Violated *Charter*

- → R. v. Bartle, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 173
- Strict causal relationship between infringement of Charter and the obtaining of the evidence not required
- → Is it "not too remotely connected with the violation"? Is it "part of the chain of events"?
- → If so, the evidence is "obtained in a manner that infringed or denied" rights

From "A" to "B" "A" Violated *Charter*

- → The circumstances of the transfer (and receipt by "Entity B") may affect admissibility under s. 24(2)?
- → e.g., good faith of "Entity B"

→ Assume "Entity A" has NOT violated the Charter in gathering the documents and information. "Entity A" transfers the documents and information to "Entity B".

→ The taking of the documents and information by "Entity B" without the consent of the original holder of the material has to be assessed.

- → Circumstances of the transfer from the holder to "Entity A": was there waiver for all purposes and uses?
- → Assess reasonable expectations of privacy. Does holder have a reasonable expectation of privacy that the information would remain with "Entity A"? In other words, does seizure by "Entity B" offend the reasonable expectation of privacy of the holder?

- → R. v. Colarusso, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 20
- → Smith v. Canada (Attorney General), [2000] F.C.J. No. 174 (C.A.), aff'd [2001] 3 S.C.R. 902
- → Conflicting lower court law on reasonable expectations of privacy in this context

"A" tips off "B"

- "Entity A" has the holder's documents, reads them, tips off "Entity B" and "Entity B" gets a warrant.
- → Not a problem, provided that the tip is sufficient (*R. v. Debot*, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1140) and the warrant is otherwise valid
- → Quebec (Attorney General) v. Laroche, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 708 (agency tips off police)

3. The *Charter* only applies to Canadian state entities

→ Foreign Entity "A" does seizure abroad and gratuitously transfers to Canadian Entity "B": same as above (re A to B transfers) BUT Charter does not apply to "Foreign Entity A".

→ Residuary protection for fair trial interest in Canada under s. 24(1): R. v. White, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 417 (see also Harrer, Buric, Schrieber and Terry)

- → An investigator with a Canadian agency goes to the foreign country and gathers evidence contrary to the Charter for the purposes of the Canadian entity
- → It is treated like domestic conduct: R. v. Harrer, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 562.

- → Canadian Entity "A" does seizure in Canada and gratuitously transfers to Foreign Entity "B": same as above (re A to B transfers) BUT Charter does not apply to Foreign Entity "B".
- → Query whether there is any practical relief in Canada against "Canadian Entity A" for a Charter infringement? (the material is being used in the foreign jurisdiction)

4. Agencies as Agents

- 4. Agency principles apply.
- → If "Entity B" uses "Entity A" as its agent to gather information for "Entity B's" purposes, A's action is ascribed to B. (R. v. Harrer, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 562)

5. Between Branches Within Agencies

- 5. The situation WITHIN agencies. Movements of documents and information within state entities can potentially be subject to *Charter* protection.
- "Entity A" has a regulatory branch and a criminal enforcement branch.

5. Between Branches Within Agencies

- → Regulatory branch can transfer information and documents it has validly received (i.e., no Jarvis violation) to its criminal enforcement branch. (Jarvis, at para. 95)
- → BUT the criminal enforcement branch cannot use the regulatory branch to seize documents for criminal purposes. The regulatory branch would then be on the other side of *Jarvis*.

5. Between Branches Within Agencies

→ Potential for fuzziness and uncertainty in the case of transfers within agencies? YES – but it is simply a matter of how the evidence stacks up against the *Jarvis* test.